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INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO. [REDACTED]

COUNTRY Lebanon

DATE DISTR. 31 Jan. 1949 25X1A2g

SUBJECT Supplementary Details on the Organization and Activity of the Lebanese Communist Party

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

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1. The Political Bureau of the Lebanese Communist Party, as has been reported previously, is made up of the following members of the Central Committee: Nicola Shawi, Fu'ad Qazan, Farajallah Hilu and Hasan Quraytim. It is directed by Khalid Baghdash, Secretary General of the Party.
2. The Political Bureau's responsibilities are distributed as follows:
 - Fu'ad Qazan - studies the Party's organizational affairs from a tactical viewpoint (toward forming a stronger organization).
 - Farajallah Hilu - studies local issues and recommends necessary action.
 - Nicola Shawi - makes contacts and answers incidental questions relating to the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties and their relations with France, the Soviet Union, and the Cominform.
 - Hasan Quraytim, an assistant member - manages the Bureau's internal affairs and substitutes for absent members when necessary.
3. The Communist Party holds no National Congress as such. As a substitute, the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties hold periodic meetings of Party leaders which are not held at a specific time, and which are attended by representatives of all the District and Local Committees. Plans for these meetings are supervised by the Central Committee and directed by Khalid Baghdash.
4. Contacts between the various branches of the Party are made through the (section) Secretaries. Instructions to the Local Committees are delivered by the Political Bureau; at present, Fu'ad Qazan is responsible for their distribution. The Secretaries read these instructions at section meetings and pass them on to Party members for necessary action.

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DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG 77/1763

Date: 21 Oct 85 By: 00005-4

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5. The Communist Party in Beirut, during its formative stage, was based on the individual Quarter cells (khalyyah), each one composed of five to nine persons. Later on the Quarter cells became known as the professions (or trades) cells. In 1939 the Party changed its system. It created the sections (firqah), each of which was composed of five cells, and thus became known as professions or trades sections. In 1942, the professions or trades section was replaced by the Quarter section, which included all Communists who lived within a Quarter, regardless of profession. This change resulted from the Party's desire to increase its membership and to organize its activities openly. ~~Comment.~~ The Party 25X1X6 later revoked this policy of amalgamation and established a number of unions' sections. ~~25X1X6~~
6. The Lebanese Communist Party has not given much attention to the question of arming its members, because the diversity of nationalities and sects living in Lebanon who are all subject to intensive foreign diplomatic and financial pressure make the Communist Party of Lebanon more effective as an instrument for furnishing the USSR with an expanding intelligence network than as an instrument for revolutionary violence, source claims. To orient the people toward communist political beliefs is considered more essential than violent armed action.
7. Individual Communists already possess arms, and they could be organized and trained to benefit the Party to a small extent, particularly in staging or exploiting local demonstrations. ~~states that the~~ 25X1X6 Armenian branch of the Lebanese Communist Party is much more heavily armed than the Arab branches.

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